A Stab at a Theory of VizRhet

What is required for an adequate theory of visual rhetoric? 

      I chose this question, because I think it’s particularly helpful in synthesizing all of the material we’ve looked at so far. That said, I don’t think the answer is particularly easy to find. Here’s an attempt: 

     The most important thing required for an “adequate” theory of visual rhetoric is a definition and understanding of rhetoric, which, as we see from our readings, is difficult to define. For Bitzer, rhetoric is situational, contextual, performs some text, alters reality, and is always persuasive. In fact, Bitzer suggests that “so controlling is the situation that we should consider it the very ground of rhetorical activity” (5). Here, it seems, the context from which the artifact arrives is most important. Other authors, in later readings, emphasize that the context in which the artifact participates is just as importance. In one of his texts, Hill suggests that visual rhetoric is associative -- that it works through symbols like Hill and Helmers suggest --  and that it functions in the realm of public sphere; in another he offers that presence, placement, and vividness of information are, in part, what makes an image rhetorical because those elements invite a kind of participation. Sontag suggests something similar that rhetoric invites identification, arguably another kind of participation. From all of these, I  see that the definition of rhetoric is fluid, yet does have some parameters. I’m going to take a stab at a definition of rhetoric synthesized from these readings -- bear with me: rhetoric is human-made (not natural), participates in some kind of public, circulates in that context, and reveals, reinforces, and/or alters the shared beliefs of a community. 

     The theory must pertain to artifacts that can be perceived by the eyes (this is important, because up until now, it seems like we’ve assumed that all people can see or that all people see in the same way). I’ve often wondered why it’s called visual rhetoric instead of imagistic rhetoric or rhetoric of the image, but now that we’ve discussed “image” as something that can be visual, verbal, and mental, I understand the difference. The difference between the visual and the image seems to be crucial to any theory of visual rhetoric. 

     It also must be anchored in a set of key terms or concepts. I stand by my group’s proposed set of threshold concepts: function, composition, rhetorical situation, meaning-making, and circulation, because I think they work with the definition I worked through above. 

     Finally, I think it’s important for a theory of visual rhetoric to understand the limitations and affordances of the visual. To Blair, visual communication is more “effective” than written communication, and I think that’s right, but we need to be aware that working within the visual is a rhetorical selection from the available semiotic resources; it is an intentional choice by a composer-rhetor. Understanding the reasoning behind that choice is crucial to understanding visual rhetoric.